Macau: Another Place, Another time

As Macau observes the tenth anniversary of its return to China later this week, a recent poll undertaken by the University of Macau showed that 96 percent of the people were “satisfied” with developments since the evening of Dec. 20, 1999, when the Portuguese flag was lowered for the last time after more than 400 years.

Indeed, the enclave’s 500,000 people have good reasons to feel satisfied, for the most part, with their lot. The economy has been in a decade-long boom due to the expansion of the gambling sector. The inaugural chief executive, Edmund Ho provided boringly stable good governance and avoided most of the missteps that accompanied Hong Kong counterpart’s early years in office.

Macau’s last years under Portuguese administration had been a time of strain, partly due to the then faltering economy but also to a spate of gangland murders connected with the casinos, which led many in Macau to cheer the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army garrison on the following day. (In fact, the garrison has stayed mostly invisible).

Recently, I returned to Macau after an absence of six years in order to update my guide book, Explore Macau:A Walking Guide and History, first published in 2002 and now being reissued next month by Blacksmith Books in Hong Kong. One can’t help but be staggered by the physical changes that have taken place..

The Portuguese had scarcely moved out before the American gambling impresarios moved in, bringing with them some of the glitz and glamour of Las Vegas. In a move even more significant even than the handover to China, Macau split the gambling monopoly into three parts and awarded two of them to Wynne Resorts and Sheldon Adelson, respectively owners of the Wynne Resort and Venetian Hotel Casino.

Everyone agreed that Macau’s gambling scene needed a face lift. It had neither the old-world charm of Monte Carlo nor the unbridled exuberance of Las Vegas. Few of the casinos offered any entertainment that could not be found by pulling the lever of slot machine. He casinos were tawdry, the dealers surly.

Tawdry is hardly the word to use for the sumptuous new gambling emporiums in today’s Macau, which among other things, boast a couple of Michelin-starred restaurants on the premises. The gaming rooms are as big as football fields, with hundreds of tables for blackjack, roulette and other games of chance.

One has to wonder if there are enough gamblers in China, indeed all of the world, to fill tables. (In fact I noticed that several of the blackjack tables were empty, the dealers waiting patiently for new punters even though it was the beginning of China’s autumn Golden Week holiday.)

Mine was not just uninformed impression, as representatives of the top gambling enterprises huddled in early October to consider whether the offerings might be outstripping the supply and to put a halt to breakneck expansion. That following on a decision in 2008 by Macau government to freeze new licenses and casino building permits.

The Chinese government too, goes through periods of handwringing over the temptations that the Macau fleshpots hold for cadres interested in taking a big portion of their country’s tax receipts to place on the Macau roulette tables, and it recently restricted residents of neighboring Guangdong province to two trips a year, later reduced to a single visit.

The influx of new casino resorts has certainly boosted the economy, but not without some costs. Foreign workers imported to deal the cards and make the beds in the giant hotels account for about 70,000 people out of a work force of 320,000. Today there are more Filipinos in Macau that Portuguese.

In 2007 police fired their weapons into the air to disperse a May-day demonstration against the importation of cheap labor to run the casinos. It was a rare public display of political disgruntlement in a territory that otherwise seems unexcitable compared with Hong Kong and overly accommodating to the Chinese.

Earlier this year the Macau Legislative Assembly enacted a local law to enforce Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law, which like its nearly identical counterpart charter in Hong Kong mandates that the territory enact laws that prohibit subversion, secessionism and protection of “state secrets” a term that is very flexible on the mainland.

When the Hong Kong Legislative Council sought to enact a similar law in 2003 it prompted biggest demonstration since Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Some 500,000 people marched in opposition. The Legco backed away from the law, and Beijing has not tried to raise the matter again.

All election groups (Macau does not have political parties) in the September election to the Legislative Assembly supported “more democracy” in theory and a gradual move to the direct election of the chief executive (now chosen by an electoral college of 300), but the democratic ethic is still tepid in Macau.

The local legislature comprises 29 seats of which twelve are directly elected (an increase of two in the past ten years), ten from functional constituencies and seven appointed by the chief executive. The proportional voting system in use means that it is extremely difficult for any one faction to gain more than two seats. The “pro-democracy” contingent has two seats, same as ten years ago.

In some ways Macau was ahead of Hong Kong in political development. It introduced directly elected sets in the 1970s, long before Hong Kong first open seats in 1992. On the other hand, Hong Kong eliminated appointed seats years ago, a system which Macau still clings to.

For the entire decade Macau has been governed by its inaugural chief executive, Edmund Ho, scion of a local banking family, whose second five-year term expires on Dec. 20. His administration has lacked the drama that accompanied Hong Kong’s initial chief, Tung Chee-hwa, who eventually resigned midway through his second term.

Macau avoided many of the problems that plagued Tung’s years, although unease about the rapid rise in housing prices mirrors early criticisms directed at Tung. The biggest domestic scandal during the first ten years, involved corruption of Ao Man-long, a former secretary of transportation convicted of taking bribes from construction deals and sentenced to 29 years in prison.
China’s presence always seems to loom much closer in Macau than in neighboring Hong Kong. The mainland or its islands are so close in some places that one could easily swim across the water and touch the shore. Every day people by the tens of thousands cross through the gargantuan immigration building at the old border gateway, into and out of Macau.

That plus the enclave’s tiny size has given Macau a unique outlook. Hong Kong defines itself in political terms, such as democracy and the rule of law. Macau defines itself more in cultural terms especially its rich history and fascinating architecture.

While encouraging the construction of more gambling casinos and playgrounds such as the Fisherman’s Wharf, Macau has not neglected the cultural side. During the past decade it successfully sought World Heritage status for a dozen or so churches, plazas gardens and houses and other monuments..

Save the Tomahawk!

To listen to disarmament specialists, the country that is raising the most serious obstacles to new moves to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defense strategy is Japan.
Japan? Is this not the nation with the famous nuclear allergy? Is it not the nation that loudly reminds everyone that it is the only country on the globe to suffer an atomic attack? Is it not the country that loudly proclaims the “Three Nos” (Never to manufacture, possess or allow nuclear weapons onto its soil)?

No country is more vocal in giving verbal support to moves to reduce nuclear weapons inventories in the world. No country has expressed more support for President Barack Obama’s call for the “logic of zero” in his speech earlier this year in Prague where he said, “we will reduce the roll of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.”
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama too has spoken about the necessity to reduce reliance on nuclear arms. He said at the United nations that Japan has the “moral responsibility as the only country that has ever experienced atomic bombings.”

But Japan is caught in a box. On one hand, Tokyo is one of the strongest advocates of nuclear disarmament, while on the other hand it relies on U.S. arms, including nuclear arms, for its own security. Lately, it has come to worry about whether it can count on America’s extended nuclear deterrence, more commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella”.

The main area of concern is Washington’s desire to retire the nuclear version of the Tomahawk cruise missile by 2013. The Tomahawk is a pilotless flying bomb capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. The conventional version was used in the Gulf War and invasion of Iraq. Tokyo sees the Tomahawk, especially submarine launched cruise missiles, as the most logical weapon of deterrence in the neighborhood, since the last tactical bombs were removed from U.S. bases in South Korea and aboard US. Navy aircraft carriers nearly two decades ago.

This summer Japanese embassy officials in Washington quietly but strongly lobbied against American plans to retire the nuclear version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. in the context of the Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture of the United States. Its recommendation will go into Washington’s forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, which will determine the basic nuclear defense, disarmament and proliferation policies for the next decade.

The body, headed by two former defense secretaries, was formed in 2008 and issued its first report in May. It said: “One particularly important ally has argued to the commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended [nuclear] deterrence depends on the specific capability to hold a variety of targets at risk in a way that is either visible or stealthy as circumstances warrant.”

It went on to elaborate: “In Asia extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some Los Angeles-class attack submarines… it has become clear that some allies in Asia would be very concerned about [Tomahawk] retirement.”

For many of the Cold War years, Tokyo didn’t fret about the nuclear umbrella or America’s will to use nuclear weapons should Japan be attacked. But in those years nuclear weapons were more clearly evident in North East Asia. American aircraft carriers were believed to carry nuclear bombs when making port calls, and tactical nuclear weapons were based in South Korea.

President George H. W. Bush ordered that the nuclear bombs be withdrawn from Korea and from aboard U.S. navy ships, excepting ballistic missile submarines, back in 1991. American nuclear attack submarines no longer carry the nuclear tipped Tomahawks as a matter of routine. The weapons are stored on U.S soil.

For all practical purposes, Northeast Asia is a nuclear free zone as far as the United States and Japan is concerned. Except that two nations that adjoin Japan, China and Russia, maintain nuclear arsenals, while a third, North Korea, has exploded two atomic devices. Some Japanese are beginning to feel a little naked.

Americans counter that Japan and other Asian allies can count on the retaliatory strength of ballistic missile submarines which still prowl the Pacific Ocean with their complements of Trident missiles as well as B-2 and B-52 bombers based in Guam.These days America’s ballistic missile submarines sometimes make port calls in Hawaii and other U.S. Pacific coast ports, but they are not likely to show up at, say, Yokusuka Naval Base, for example. And in any case, they would run afoul of Japan’s stated Three Nos, of which one is not to allow nuclear weapons to be brought into its territory.

By contrast it is estimated that more than 400 nuclear bombs – the kind delivered by fighter-bombers – are still in place in Europe and well integrated into NATO nuclear strike plans. They are earmarked for delivery by the air forces of even non-nuclear weapons states such as Germany, and Belgium. Nothing similar exists in Northeast Asia.

The lobby campaign to save the Tomahawk was undertaken by the previous Liberal Democratic Party government under former prime minister Taro Aso. The new government headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has not, so far as is known, made any efforts to block the retirement of the supposedly obsolete weapons systems.

One area where it has been loud and vocal is in its call for full disclosure of so-called secret codicils to the 1960 security treaty in which the Japanese government pledged in advance to permit the U.S. to bring nuclear weapons into its territory and territorial waters without prior consultations. The Japanese press has been flogging this story with almost daily revelations from retired foreign ministry officials that such documents exist, something that the previous government formally denied. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has promised to publish all of the details by January.

In some respects it is something of a tempest in a teapot. Before Bush ordered them removed, it was widely assumed that U.S. carriers brought the weapons into port when making port calls while Tokyo turned a blind eye. After all, there were no floating nuclear weapons receptacles outside the territorial limits where they could unload them like Wild West gunslingers checking their guns at the door before entering the saloon.

So far, the new government has not suggested that it might abrogate the secret documents. It only wants to expose them in the overall interests of governmental transparency. It would have the added advantage, of course, of embarrassing the former LDP government.

Too Big to Fail?

A national icon teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, dragged down by huge, underfunded legacy costs, a history of mismanagement and a harsh business climate. A new government determined to bail it out because it is “too big to fail”. General Motors in the U.S.? No, Japan Airlines, the country’s premier air carrier.

The situation facing the new government headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was somewhat similar to that presented by General Motors when President Barack Obama took office. Like GM, the Japanese airline is a national icon that has fallen on hard times, not just buffeted by cruel economic circumstances but by its own missteps and generous pensions.

To carry the American analogy further, Japan’s second carrier, All Nippon Airlines, like the Ford Motor Co., is in better financial shape. The airline even had the wherewithal to hire Japanese teen golfing phenom, Ryo Ishikawa, as its official spokesman. JAL has suspended all broadcast advertising. It can’t afford the cost.

Even before the new Japanese government took office in mid-October, the former administration had been taking emergency steps to salvage the airline, which reported a JPY 96 billion operating loss for the first half of 2009. In June the government-owned Development Bank of Japan loaned the airline about JPY100 billion to help keep it afloat to the end of the year, one of several such loans over the past few years.

The Ministry of Lands, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism was orchestrating equity investments from other international airlines, such as Delta, American, and British Airways, while the company itself presented a new plan for cutting costs by layoffs and by cutting back on unprofitable routes. This was the situation when the newly elected government took charge.

The new transport minister, Seiji Maehara took a careful look at the restructuring plan and threw it out. He determined that the airline was in too deep for normal cost-cutting initiatives, not even draconian layoffs. Efforts to involve foreign airlines, especially Delta, were initially rejected as too little and too complicated, given the system if airline alliances.

(However, American Airlines announced late last week that it might team up with private equity firm TPG to invest some $300 million in JAL. The two air lines are members of the Oneworld aviation alliance; teaming with Delta would require JAL switching to SkyTeam, a costly and complicated transition. Meanwhile, Delta and alliaces have come up with their own $1 billion package.)

The new Democratic party of Japan (DPJ) might have decided to let the airline go bankrupt. After all, many American airlines have used bankruptcy protection to get their houses in order, including JAL’s presumed rescuer, Delta in 2005. Instead, it decided to essentially make it a ward of the state. To coin a phrase, it is too big to fail.

Or to put another way, JAL is too important to fail. With approximately 17,000 employees JAL is not quite in the General Motors’ class. Even if every JAL employee were laid off, it would hardly cause a ripple in the unemployment rate. It buys not builds aircraft so there is no widespread network of suppliers to worry about. There are other reasons to prop it up.

“We cannot afford to let JAL go under as its flights account for 60 percent of the total in Japan,” said Maehara. “If its flights stop, the Japanese economy as a whole, local economies and exchange with foreign countries will be seriously hampered.”

Under the new policy, JAL will become, in essence the ward of a new government-private sector Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation, with Maehara and other government officials deeply involved. The government is prepared to guarantee up to JPY 1.6 trillion that the new corporations borrows to give to JAL and other companies.

The rebuilding of JAL will based on a government loan of JPY 300 billion, financial institutions forgiveness of debts and conversion of bonds into company shares, a JPY 180 billion bridge loan to carry the company over next perilous few weeks. The bridge loan is needed because the carrier’s business is deteriorating so fast that there was worry it would not survive past November.

Vast amounts of public money were injected into the major banks during Japan’s financial crisis in the 1990s, but in that case, the government was trying to prop up an entire sector of the economy. The money destined for JAL would be the largest amount spent on an individual, private corporation.

The government is also expected to take aim at JAL’s huge pension liabilities, which the government says need to be cut by about 200 percent if the airline is to recover. If the retirees don’t approve the cuts (and a two-thirds majority is required under current law), the government says it will pass a law mandating it. That would be a big step considering that the DPJ is supported by the unions.

Japan Airlines was the nation’s flag carrier from 1953 to 1987, when it was privatized. I n many ways it set the standard for many other Asian airlines that followed such as Singapore Airlines, Garuda and Thai Airways. There was a time when JAL’s super gracious passenger service was the standard for all airlines to emulate.

Although it was privatized in 1987, in many ways it remained Japan’s flag carriers and that contributed to its current difficulties. The previous government was famous for sprinkling public works projects around the country, including airports for every one-horse town. JAL was obliged to serve those airlines even though many were unprofitable. As part of its reorganization, JAL has been cutting back drastically on both domestic and international routes.

Japan airlines was been buffeted by many of the ill winds that have hurt the bottom lines of all the world’s airlines, such as the global recession, rising petroleum prices and the swine flu epidemic. But it has also suffered from other problems unique to Japan.

Landing fees at Narita International Airport and other international and domestic airports in Japan are among the highest in the world, and they eat into airline profits. The new government is on record as favoring lowering such fees. Similarly, taxes and jet fuel charges in Japan are fairly exorbitant.

Despite its dire straits, JAL has had no trouble attracting foreign companies, such as American and Delta, ready to prop up the company. Changes in aviation policy and the impending reconfiguration of Japan’s main airports make an alliance with JAL still an attractive proposition.

On Oct 26 U.S. and Japanese aviation officials started talks in Tokyo to reach an agreement, perhaps by year’s end, on an open-skies accord. It would allow airlines more flexibility in determining flight routes and numbers at their own discretion rather than government fiat.

Couple that with the expansion of departure and arrival slots at the two main Tokyo area airports, Narita and Haneda. Minister Maehara is on record as wanting to turn Haneda, which now serves mostly domestic flights, into an Asian aviation hub competing with such new aviation portals as Inchon in South Korea and Shanghai for Asian traffic.

Obama Sidesteps Bases Issue

It might come under the category of something that couldn’t have happened at a worse time. Less than one week before President Barack Obama arrived in Japan for a visit, a U.S. soldier was taken into custody on Okinawa in connection with a hit and run incident in which an elderly Okinawan man was killed.

It is, of course, incidents like this one, rare though they may be, not to mention noise, congestion and other daily irritants, that led Japan and the U.S. to negotiate a complex deal to lower the American military’s large “footprint” on the southern island, an agreement that has ballooned into a major alliance crisis in some minds.

In 2006 the two governments agreed and in early 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed, an agreement under which Washington would withdraw 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam and close the Futenma Air Station in southern part of the island that is now totally surrounded by urban development.

In return, Tokyo agreed to foot a major portion of the estimated $10 billion relocation costs and build, also at Japan’s expense, the Marines a new high tech heliport on reclaimed land at a another, less populated location on Okinawa in the township of Nago.

In October Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid down a strong marker saying bluntly that a deal is a deal and that Washington could not entertain any but minor adjustments. Move Futenma to another part of Okinawa or the whole deal is off, he said.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power with one main fixed idea: that government ministers, not the civil servants, should be making policy. On the Futenma issue that has led to some confusion. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa favors implementing the agreement as is. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada wants to merge Futenma with the big U.S. Air force Base at Kadena,

But the final decision will be made by the new prime minister? Yukio Hatoyama, and he has yet to take a position one way or the other, except to say he wants to postpone any decision pending the outcome of a series of national and local elections coming in the new year.

Despite Gates, President Obama and his advisors reluctantly agreed to side step this issue during his visit, which began Saturday and give the new government a little latitude to reach a consensus “It will take several months for the new Japanese administration to become fully functional; we have to be patient,” Said Kurt Campbell, Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

But it is also clear that Washington’s patience will wear thin pretty quickly. Every day that the decision is postponed brings forth more news stories and opinion pieces lamenting the “troubled U.S.-Japanese alliance.” Pretty soon they may become a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy. Washington wants to wrap this deal up by year’s end.

Hatoyama says he wants to defer a final decision at least until the election for Mayor of Nago, the host town for the new air base, scheduled for January. Beyond that is the July election for the half of the House of Councillors, the upper house of Japan’s bicameral parliament, and next November for the governor of Okinawa.

It is hard to know what Hatoyama expects to gain from delay. Perhaps he is hoping that incumbent Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukaru, who supports the new heliport in his town, will win re-election and give him some political cover for implementing the deal.

But public feelings against the relocation plan are rising rapidly on Okinawa, and even the Nago mayor is beginning to back pedal. “My stance remains unchanged, but the best idea would be to relocate it out of [Okinawa] prefecture,” the mayor told the Asahi Shimbun newspaper.

Hatoyama is obviously hoping that the DPJ will gain a clear majority in the July upper house election, so he is no longer dependent on his coalition partners to pass bills. They include the Social Democratic Party, which is even more strongly opposed to relocation. That would give him some added flexibility.

On the other hand, the longer this matter drags on, the more likely it could become a campaign issue in that election. The opposition Liberal Democratic Party, practically prostrate in the aftermath of its pasting in the general election last August, is beginning to perk up, sensing that the new government might be vulnerable on the charge of endangering the alliance.

The new government, in office for less than two-months, is already losing some support in public opinion polls. They are now around 60 percent favorable, albeit from unsustainable high levels of euphoria immediately after the government formally took office in mid-October. Successes in two upper house by-elections, confirms basic public support for the new government.

The proposed halt in Japan’s contribution to the War on Terror through refueling coalition warships in the Indian Ocean, set to expire in January, is another sore point, although it has not been elevated to the position of a “test” of the alliance in the same way that the Okinawan base issue has.

Most of the refueling this year has been for Pakistani naval vessels, so it is hard to maintain that the operation is “vital” to operations in landlocked Afghanistan. On the other hand, a pullback here might encourage other nations with unpopular troop commitments to withdraw also.

Hatoyama will outline his substitute plan to contribute between $4 and $5 billion dollars over the next five years for expanded job training, agricultural development and other civilian support activities, but he is not prepared to send Self Defense force troops to the region to protect the aid workers.

A Deal's a Deal

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last week staked out a hard line position over the relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station in Okinawa to another location on the southern island during his recent trip to Japan to prepare the way for President Barack Obama’s expected visit next month.

As far as Washington is concerned, the elaborate plan to reshuffle troops on Okinawa and lower the island’s overall military “footprint”, which it negotiated with the previous government headed by the Liberal Democratic Party, is a done deal.

The U.S. will entertain only minor changes, such as shifting the proposed new runway a few meters further off shore. Inaction on relocation of the air station would jeopardize the agreed relocation of 8,000 Marines and their families to Guam, Gates said.

Gate’s remarks have elevated what was a fairly obscure technical matter into a major issue between Japan and the United States and the first great test of freshman Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s alliance management skills. Hatoyama entered office last month when his party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won an historic majority.

Futenma has been an American base since the end of World War II and a Marine Corps air station since 1960. It is currently home for about 3,000 Marines and an air group consisting mainly of helicopters. Over the years, the neighboring city of Ginowan has burgeoned from a village into a metropolis, now virtually surrounding the base and its runway.

It took years of negotiations for Washington and Tokyo to agree on a plan to realign the bases on Okinawa, a relatively small island which today supports about three quarters of the US military manpower in the country, so it is not surprising that Washington doesn’t want to start anew with a new government.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, anticipating a possible DPJ election victory as far back as last February, made sure to get the then government of prime minister Taro Aso to sign on the dotted line when she visited Japan in her first swing through Asia. The new government must honor the deal it predecessor made, she says now.

When it was in opposition, the DPJ made some sweeping demands about Okinawa. It opposed the idea of closing Futenma and building a new air station in northern part of the island on reclaimed (mostly coral) land. It wanted to move the air station out of Okinawa entirely. The party also criticized the $6 billion that Tokyo promised to help pay to relocate 8,000 Marines and their families to Guam.

However, as the election approached and prospect of holding power became more and more a reality, the DPJ has softened its position. The party’s official election manifesto merely called vaguely for re-examining future options for American bases in Japan.

In early October, Hatoyama said some things that made it seem that he could be persuaded to accept the agreement reached between Japan and the U.S. including relocating Futemna somewhere within Okinawa prefecture. Almost immediately he had to back pedal in the face of criticism from his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, and others in his own party.

“While bearing in mind the wishes of the people in Okinawa, I will negotiate with the U.S. and come to a final conclusion in the matter,” the PM said. He said his government wanted to look into various unspecified “options” and would not feel obliged to determine its final policy by the time Obama visits.

One of the options might be to move the Marines to the massive Kadena Air Force Base. The base already is crowded, but an intriguing story was floated a month ago suggesting that the U.S. might withdraw the F-16 wing at Misawa air base in northern Japan and part of the F-15 Wing based at Kadena, The latter’s removal might open opportunities to relocate the Marine helicopters there.

The political forces favoring closing Futenma and against building a substitute in Okinawa prefecture are formidable. They include a most of the prefectural assembly, all four Diet members from Okinawa, most of Hatoyama’s large contingent of freshmen back benchers in the Diet, his coalition partner, the SDP and 68 percent of Okinawan people, according to recent polls.

A permanent tent city of protestors has been camped out on the beach at Hinoko township near where the new runway would be built, essentially daring the government to try and move them. How a determined minority, augmented by sympathizers, can frustrate Washington and Tokyo’s plans can be seen from two past examples.

In the 1950s the Americans determined to extend the runway at Tachikawa Air Base in the Tokyo suburbs, a move necessary to accommodate high performance jet aircraft. Protestors camped out at one end of the runway daring anyone to remove them literally for years. Eventually, the Americans gave up and moved out. Tachikawa is now a park dedicated, ironically, to Japan’s wartime emperor, Hirohito.

The dogged opposition of a handful of farmers, supported by outside admirers, permanently crippled Tokyo’s grand plan to build a major international airport in the rice fields of Narita far outside of Tokyo. Only this month has Narita opened an extended second runway, of a projected three runways, more than 40 years after the airport opened.

It may be that Secretary Gates was playing “bad cop” to President Obama’s “good cop” routine when he visits Tokyo on the first leg of his Asian trip in mid-November. That would permit the president to allow the new Japanese government to gain face by graciously reopening the negotiations. Meanwhile, after due reflection, Hatoyama graciously concedes the need to build a replacement air field in Okinawa. Everybody is happy.

That is one possible scenario. It is also possible that the American side will dig in its heels on the proposition that a deal is a deal, and decide that, for the sake of future alliance, it must demonstrate early on who is still the boss.

Early Days

The new Japanese government, headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was one month old on Friday Oct. 16. His Democratic party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power on a powerful sentiment of change. It is, of course, early days, but it is not too soon to see if it is delivering on this promised change.

The prime minister himself spent much of his first month in office on the road, visiting New York and Pittsburgh for the opening of the United Nations and the G-20 Summit. He flew to Copenhagen to lobby for Tokyo’s unlikely bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. Then he flew to Seoul and Beijing to meet with leaders of China and South Korea.

His cabinet ministers, however, have been in the news constantly. The cabinet had hardly been sworn in before Lands and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara flew to Gunma prefecture in central Japan to inspect the Yamba Dam project in central Gunma and declare it would be terminated.

The DPJ campaigned on the notion that the old regime spent too much taxpayer money on wasteful public works projects of which the Yamba Dam is the poster child. During the month the minister announced that the government was freezing construction of 48 of the 143 dam projects approved by the previous administration.

The Hatoyama government eventually plans to terminate about 100 dam projects budged at approximately 8 trillion yen in construction costs (some of the saving may be offset by local reimbursements for the disruption and job losses that will accompany these terminations.)

Indeed, Maehara is turning into something of a star of the new government’s first month in office. It seems as if he is on television every day meeting with prefectural officials over dam projects, conferring with Japan Airlines over bailout plans, meeting with local governments over plans to turn Haneda Airport into a major regional aviation hub, meeting, meeting, meeting . . .

Of course, the fact that he has movie-idol good looks doesn’t hurt, but it is also true that many of the new government’s most important initiatives fall under his portfolio, Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. This includes plans to eliminate the tolls on express ways and the “temporary” (in place for the past for past 30 years) gasoline surcharge to fund new road construction.

Maehara also has the Okinawa portfolio, and has made at least one inspection trip to the southern island, where the relocation of American forces is the hot topic. However, as it impacts relations with the U.S., it is likely that Hatoyama himself and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada will take the lead in this sensitive issue.

If Maehara is the star of the month, then Shizuka Kamei, Minister for Postal Reform and Financial Services, is the “bad boy” of the new government. In his latter role, he went off the reservation early on by proposing a blanket debt moratorium on small businesses and some individuals.

The Hatoyama government clearly does not like this proposal, which some estimate could cost the country’s banks trillions of yen in lost interest. But it is not easy to rein him in. Kamei heads his own small party in coalition with the government and is not subject to party discipline. He is a loose cannon.

The government needs the votes, few as they are, of Kamei’s New People’s Party and its other coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDR) since it is just short of a majority in the House of Councilors, the upper house of Japan’s bicameral parliament. One can assume that the DJP will strive mightily to win a clear majority in July’s election so that can dump its partners.

Another prominent figure in the new government is Yoshito Sengoku. As minister of state for administration he is the man responsible for finding and cutting the “waste” in government spending that it plans to apply to fulfill its campaign promise to provide cash allowances to parents and end tuition for secondary schools.

In the first month in office Sengoku reportedly has axed 2.5 trillion yen from the previous administration’s proposed 14 trillion yen supplementary budget. When finished, the party will be turn attention to cutting fat from the 2010 fiscal budget. The implementation of the child allowances will likely be incorporated into that budget, which goes into effect in April.

In other ways, the new administration is pointing to change, Justice Minister Keiko Chiba, the only woman besides SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima in the cabinet, wants to fulfill a long-time ambition of Japanese feminists to permit married women to keep their maiden name if they choose. She plans to introduce legislation permitting this when the Diet convenes later this month.

During the long period of Liberal Democratic Party government, 20 attempts were made to change the Civil Law to allow women to use their maiden names; all were defeated by conservatives who argued that such a change would impact family unity. The influx of many young freshmen legislators, many of them women, may change this.

It is also possible that Minister Chiba may lead a de facto moratorium capital punishment, as she is a member of the Parliamentary League for the Abolishment of the Death Penalty. The above-mentioned Kamei is also a longtime opponent who happens to head the League; SDP leader Fukushima also opposes the death penalty.

It falls to the justice minister to sign death warrants for convicted murderers after their appeals are exhausted. The number of executions was accelerating under the previous administration (Hatoyama’s brother Kunio signed 11 warrants when he was justice minister). There are about 100 prisoners on Japan’s death rows.

Matters impacting the alliance with the United States are likely to be put off until President Barack Obama’s visit in mid-November. However, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said flatly that Japan’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean will end in January when the authorization expires.

Washington seems to be taking this expected news equitably. It is more likely to resist any changes in plans agreed to with the previous government to relocate some American marine forces in Okinawa, and there were signs from Hatoyama this past week that the Japanese government may acquiesce in thism matter.

What Alliance?

There has been considerable handwringing in the Western press, especially among Americans, over the future of the U.S.-Japan military alliance under the new regime. Will Japan’s new masters seek to undermine the security of Asia and American interests by steering a more independent course?

Never mind that the incoming prime minister Yukio Hatoyama has stated that the alliance is fundamental to Japan’s security and that he has no intention of undermining what pundits on both sides of the Pacific persist in calling the “cornerstone” of America’s position in Asia.

A cornerstone, perhaps, but not an alliance. Japan is a close friend, fellow democracy, trading partner and increasingly a collaborator on the world stage. But it is not an ally. That is strictly a courtesy title, and since the health of the “alliance” is going to come under increasing scrutiny in coming months one should have a clearer idea of what it really is.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed with Japan in 1960 replacing an earlier treaty, is basically a deal. The U.S. promises to defend Japan if it comes under attack, with nuclear weapons if necessary (the nuclear umbrella). In exchange, Japan provides the U.S. with bases which it can use as it sees fit to advance its greater security interests in Asia and as far as the Middle East.

Those bases are not necessarily designed, or at present even configured to merely defend Japan. In the past they have been staging areas for the Vietnam War and now the Afghanistan War. The largest air base near Tokyo, Yokota AFB, for example, hasn’t had a permanent collection attack aircraft or interceptors for decades. Indeed, according to Kyodo News Service, Washington is considering withdrawing the wing of F-16s at Misawa AFB and reducing the number of f-15s at Kadena AFB in Okinawa.

Japan, however, is not obligated to come to the defense of the U.S. if it is attacked. Indeed, it would be illegal for Tokyo to do so under the current liberal interpretation of its American-written constitution, which rather explicitly prohibits Japan from possessing any military force whatsoever.

This provision – Article 9 – has been interpreted broadly enough to permit Japan to build one of the largest and most sophisticated militaries on the globe. But the clause has still been interpreted in such a way as to prevent “collective defense” In other words, Japan can defend itself but not others.

Nobody worried much about collective defense during most of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was considered the main threat. But it has grown into an issue with the emergence of a bellicose nuclear-armed North Korea and to a lesser extent, the rapid modernization of China’s armed forces.

North Korea’s recent test of a multi-stage rocket in April, which it fired directly over Japan landing in the North Pacific, raised the interesting speculation whether Japan could legally shoot down a North Korean missile headed toward the U.S. that came within range. A strict reading of Japan’s laws would say no.

In another hypothetical, but possibly more realistic, scenario North Korean naval vessels intercept and threaten to sink or capture an unarmed or lightly armed American naval surveillance ship in international waters of the Sea of Japan. A Japanese destroyer happens to be close by. Does it come to the American vessel’s aid?

I would be willing to guess that Tokyo would order the destroyer to resist the North Koreans and let the legal chips fall where they may. The consequences of simply standing by and doing nothing would be politically devastating. The American public would never understand – or care about - the legal nuances “collective defense.”

(In the real U.S.S. Pueblo incident in 1968, the Japanese Self Defense Forces did not figure at all, nor, to my knowledge, were they called on for help. The U.S. had more assets in the region than it does now. That they could not be successfully deployed to defend the Pueblo from humiliating capture is another story).

When I came to Yokota as a junior officer shortly after the Pueblo Incident, U.S. forces in Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces might as well have existed on different plants. In all my time there I never once met a SDF officer. There was no liaison or coordination. No contact that I could see. Nothing. I never served in a NATO country, but I have to believe that there would have been much more social or professional intercourse with officers of the Royal Air force or the Belgian Air Force.

That began to change in the 1990s, the catalyst being the1991 Gulf War. Japan ponyed up billions of dollars to support the coalition, but, consistent with its anti-war principles, provided no troops. Tokyo was stunned afterwards at how ungrateful Washington and others were for their generous financial support. The wanted, to use the current vernacular, boots on the ground.

That began a slow evolution in Japan’s use of its military. The Diet (parliament) passed laws that allowed Japanese to participate in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and elsewhere. In 1996 Washington and Tokyo inked the Joint Security Declaration in which Japan promised to provide logistical support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Joint research in missile defenses was authorized.

In recent years Japanese armed forces have ventured far from Japan. For some years, a naval oiler has replenished ships, including American naval vessels, supporting operations over Afghanistan. But this had nothing to do with any kind of treaty obligation but more a general sense that Japan had to do something more in the War on Terror than write checks.

The defeated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) made collective defense one of its manifesto planks. The triumphant Democratic part of Japan (DPJ) was silent on the matter. Speaking to journalists a couple months before the election, senior party leader Seiji Maehara dismissed the North Korean missile hypothetical as an “abstraction.”

This year, though, the Diet passed a law to formally authorize the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (navy) to take part in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia. As part of the legislation, Japanese war ships were specifically authorized to come to the aid of non-Japanese vessels threatened by pirates. That may seem like an obvious thing, but in a sense it was revolutionary. It was the first time that Japan had taken a baby step toward collective defense.

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